



Divided Development: Post-War Ideas on River
Utilization and their Influence on the Development of
the Danube
Citation for published version (APA):
Lagendijk, V. C. (2015). Divided Development: Post-War Ideas on River Utilization and their Influence on
the Development of the Danube. The International History Review, 37(1), 80-98.
https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.859165





Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
Taverne
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 03 Nov. 2021
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rinh20
The International History Review
ISSN: 0707-5332 (Print) 1949-6540 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rinh20
Divided Development: Post-War Ideas on River
Utilisation and their Influence on the Development
of the Danube
Vincent Lagendijk
To cite this article: Vincent Lagendijk (2015) Divided Development: Post-War Ideas on River
Utilisation and their Influence on the Development of the Danube, The International History Review,
37:1, 80-98, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2013.859165
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.859165
Published online: 16 Jan 2014.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 281
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 5 View citing articles 
Divided Development: Post-War Ideas on River Utilisation and their
Influence on the Development of the Danube
Vincent Lagendijk*
In the 1950s the United States feared that the Soviet Union would overtake their
leading position in river development. The Tennessee Valley Authority had
become a household name across the globe, but now the Soviets, too, began to
share their expertise in this field. This article examines how Soviet experiences
were applied on the river Danube. It hence discusses the cold-war discourse of
modernisation, exemplified by river development, from both the capitalist and
Communist perspective. Particular attention is paid to the institutional context of
this transfer, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, and the attempts of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe to play a role in this process.
Keywords: river development; East–West relations; CMEA; international
organisations
A 1957 US Senate Committee report raised grave concerns: ‘The Soviets are climax-
ing this continuing endeavour in the proclaimed belief that results will assure these
Communist nations surpass the United States in any competition existing in this
major economic field.’1 This field was river development: the practice of putting run-
ning water to work for industry, agriculture, and society as a whole. ‘The Communist
countries’ realistic effort and emphasis in executing these irrigation, hydroelectric,
flood-control, and water-transport functions‘, the Senate report continued, ’are
more powerfully and longer sustained and exceed in volume and sacrifice involved
all their missile and satellite performances [. . .]’.2
This citation, and the report as a whole, acknowledges historian Odd Arne West-
ad’s point that during the cold war the United States regarded Soviet Communism
as an ‘alternative modernity’, and therewith a potential rival of ‘Americanism’.3 His
colleague Michael Latham defines ‘modernisation’ as both an intellectual theory and
a political practice.4 Indeed, the ‘West’ did not monopolise development ideas and
assistance. One observer in 1965 noted that ‘[i]t is not only the West, of course, which
is “in the market” as concerns foreign aid’, as the Soviet Union had struck technical-
assistance agreements with over thirty developing nations.5
From the 1950s onwards, much of the Soviet Union’s foreign assistance aimed
at industrial development, including transport and communications, as well as
hydroelectric power projects. The Soviets indeed built - or at least claimed to - at
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sizes that made Western hydro plants, for example, look like ‘watermills from the
Middle Age’.6
Were the Senate report’s fears really justified? Was the Soviet Union an active pro-
moter of its own ‘style’ of river-basin development? How did this compare and con-
trast to the US way of river (re-)engineering, in particular the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA)? This article will answer these questions with the development of the
Danube as case study. It thus examines the cold-war discourse and praxis of moderni-
sation, and in particular river development, as seen through both a capitalist (or,
‘democratic’) and Communist lens. This is a novel approach. Previous studies have
identified the cold-war relevance of river development and its discourse as a potent
instrument of showing superpower capabilities. They did so primarily from a US per-
spective. From that point of view, river development was seen as ‘weapon’ against
underdevelopment, thereby taking away potential fertile ground for the proliferation
of Communism.7 This article integrates the Socialist perspective into the equation.
The Danube is a good case in point; initially the US TVA was taken as a model,
before the region came under strong Soviet influence. Moscow channelled its hydro-
expertise through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, 1949).
While this body has often been regarded as an imperialist tool in the hands of the
Soviets, this image has recently been criticised. The focus on the Danube provides
insight into the dynamics of the CMEA, as well as the sway of the Soviet ‘model’
over the Danube basin’s development. The paper proceeds, first, with a section on
pre-1940 planning and development, followed by the articulation of TVA-style post-
war ideas about exploiting the Danube. This then in turn is contrasted with the post-
1948 Socialist development of the Danube with the CMEA framework. The paper
concludes by reflecting upon the Danube’s development, particularly in light of the
US model of river development.
I. River development in the cold war
The cold war provided important incentives for development assistance.8 According
to Arturo Escobar, the cold war was ‘undoubtedly one of the single most important
factors at play in the conformation of the strategy of development’.9 After the Sec-
ond World War, both the First (capitalist) and Second (Communist) provided devel-
opment assistance to the Third World. The so-called Point Four speech, part of the
1949 inaugural speech of President Harry S. Truman, is often seen as the official start
of Western development aid. For the East, the establishment of the CMEA in the
same year can be regarded as the Communist response – in particular to the Marshall
Plan. The competition between both ideologies was played out, to a large extent, in
the underdeveloped parts of the world.
In the West as well as in the East, underdevelopment presented (and was per-
ceived) both a threat as well as an opportunity. Poverty and overpopulation made
countries potentially prone to socialist revolutions, and providing material and tech-
nical assistance were tools of cold-war allegiance-building. Both the First and Second
World framed the ‘aid rush’ as an ideological struggle. A State Department official
interpreted the CMEA as ‘to mean that the USSR has decided to accept the challenge
and, most surprisingly, has decided to wage the contest with the weapons in which we
have tremendous superiority; i.e., proving assistance in the form of material aid (the
Marshall Plan) and know-how (President Truman’s Point Four)’.10
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River development had a prominent place in the economic arsenal of both the
Soviet Union and the United States.11 Since the end of the Second World War, the
United States actively exported and promoted its own river-basin development
model abroad. It, for example, based itself on the water-management experiences of
the US West of the Bureau of Reclamation, responsible for the massive Hoover
Dam on the Colorado River.12 But arguably the most important development
‘weapon’ was the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, 1933). As one of the emblematic
projects of President Roosevelt’s New Deal, the TVA sought to develop the back-
ward US South by putting the Tennessee River to use through a system of multi-pur-
pose dams. The TVA served (and still serves) as a multi-purpose body, pursuing
various aims simultaneously; its dam-building programme contributed to power gen-
eration, flood control and navigation improvement, and was accompanied by refor-
estation, agricultural, and social programmes.13
Since 1933, planners from all ideological strides and corners of the world found
inspiration in the TVA. In the current body of literature the TVA is often portrayed
as a model that could be ‘exported’, ‘transplanted’, or even imposed. David Ekbladh
recently declared it a core part of the United States’ development mission abroad.14
The Soviet Union, too, enjoyed considerable experience in river development.
During the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet Union and the United States were ’caught‘ in
a race to build the boldest and biggest dam, as Hoover Dam and Dnieprostroi Dam
(1925–32) were under construction almost simultaneously.15 The main trust for this
effort came from GOELRO (1920), the central plan for the electrification of the
Soviet Union. GOELRO provided the ’technical and material basis’ for socialism,
and reorganised the country’s economic structure. By 1930 its planning aims were
fulfilled, even ‘over-fulfilled’ according to the Soviets.16 GOELRO stressed a maxi-
mum use of local fuels and resources. In the river-rich Soviet Union, this implied uti-
lising a lot of hydropower.17 But more in general, Soviet river development was part
and parcel of a wider transformation of the landscape. Reshaping the landscape with
the help of new technologies should lead to ‘new men’: at least this was the regime’s
underlying rationale.18 These large-scale Soviet water projects served territorial-
political aims at the same time. Just like other large-scale infrastructure projects,
irrigation canals and hydroelectric installations sought to bring development to
peripheral parts of the Soviet Union, while integrating them more strongly with the
economic heartland.19
Based on these experiences, the Gidroproekt Institute was established in 1930 for
designing and building hydroelectric plants. All research, development, and design
work for hydroelectric plants was concentrated in a single organisation. Gidroproekt
was a subdivision of the People’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (=apo*>Z6
ko<4ccap4aH &>yHpe>>4x *e:, Narodnyy komissariat vnutrennikh del, or NKVD),
the internal and secret police under Stalin.20 Its chairman was the notorious engineer
Sergei Yakovlevich Zhuk. He had a hand in the design and construction of major
works, including the White Sea–Baltic canal (Belomor Canal, 1931–3) and the
Moscow canal, as well as several hydroelectric power stations and irrigation systems.
These projects used forced labour from the GULag system.21 In addition,
Gidroproekt’s engineering division was staffed by a cohort of engineers that learned
the ropes through the construction of the Dnieprostroi Dam.22
Gidroproekt played a very active role in post-war reconstruction, as Stalin gave
new impetus to gigantic hydraulic projects after 1945. In the 1950s, the Soviet leader-
ship pushed for the construction of huge power stations, for example at Stalingrad,
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as well as hundreds of kilometres of new canals like the Volga–Don system, as well as
irrigation channels on the Dnieper River.23 Later plans were even more ambitious,
far-reaching, and murderous, including the transformation of the Siberian landscape
and plans for the diversion of entire rivers. Gidroproekt again aligned its agenda
with the broader ideological and political aims of the Soviet leadership, as the impact
on nature and respect for human life was subordinated to short-term economic
gains.24
In ways somewhat similar to the United States, the Soviet regime exported its
expertise abroad - a history that remains to be written.25 Although Gidroproekt pri-
marily developed rivers within the Soviet Union, it also employed activities abroad
since the 1950s. Stalin’s successor Nikita Khrushchev devoted more attention to the
Third World, and pledged over US$6 billion in the next two decades.26 Gidroproekt
supervised activities on the Nile in Egypt, and later in Afghanistan and Nepal. It also
assisted in the design for the vast hydropower plant at the Three Gorges on the
Yangtze.27
In the United States and elsewhere in the West, the Soviet style of river develop-
ment was seen as undemocratic and totalitarian. Tireless TVA advocate and former
TVA chairman David E. Lilienthal quoted a Supreme Court judge with approval:
‘TVA represents an idea that can be utilised as one of the major influences to
turn back the tide of Communism which today threatens to engulf Asia.’28
Ekbladh argued that the TVA was part of US foreign policy to stimulate liberal
development - for ‘economic and social transformation guided by social science and
planning’. Many thus came to view the TVA as a democratic take on planning, and
an inverse version of the Soviet totalitarian model which was associated with dicta-
torship and coercion.29 President John F. Kennedy praised the TVA at its thirtieth
anniversary, arguing that visitors from abroad gained ‘an impression of vitality and
growth, and the ability of people to work together in a free society’.30
As US and Soviet ideas went abroad after 1945, packaged as technical and eco-
nomic assistance, they also provided the means to show off their superpower status.
In some case, they found themselves competing over single rivers. One such case
where river-development ideas seemed to clash was the Danube, which is described
in detail in the subsequent sections.
II. Plans for the Danube basin
US and Soviet conceptions of river development did not find the Danube a tabula
rasa. One important function of the river was navigation, and this was reflected in
international regulation. Bilateral treaties dated back to 1680, and a general regula-
tion of freedom of navigation on international rivers was part of the acts of the Con-
gress of Vienna of 1815. Navigational affairs fell under the competence of the
European Danube Commission (EDC), in existence since 1856. After the First World
War, the EDC was joined by another commission, namely the International Danube
Commission (IDC).31 Navigation was the core business of both; the IDC was respon-
sible for the Danube between Ulm (Germany) and Braila (Romania), and the EDC
for the so-called Seedonau - the part of the Danube that accommodates sea-going
vessels starting at Braila and continuing to the Black Sea.32
Since the late nineteenth century, electricity generation became a newly perceived
function of rivers. The Austro-Hungarian imperial government considered building
power plants in the river in 1910, but the First World War and the subsequent
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dismantling of the Habsburg Empire put a halt to such plans.33 Successor states all
tried to seize their part of the river in a hydro-political struggle: the Czechoslovak
delegation argued at the Paris Peace Conference for a larger share of the river, but to
no avail.34 Without a hegemonic riparian state, the use of the Danube depended on
international co-operation. France and Great Britain, the victorious Great Powers
of the First World War, ensured their representation on the EDC while dismissing
the ‘losers’ Austria, Hungary, and Germany - despite being riparian states. Nazi Ger-
many agitated against this practice in 1936, and weaved a new web of bilateral con-
ventions that effectively replaced the Commissions, making international co-
operation less likely. The last meeting of the IDC, planned for the summer of 1940,
was disrupted by the outbreak of war.35
Ideas from the United States left a strong imprint on initial post-war plans. US
presence in the occupation zones in Austria and Germany justified a more active role
in the reconstruction of the region and the utilisation of the river, at least according
to the US administration. This new role built strongly upon US achievements in
river-basin development, and the TVA in particular. In July 1945, proposals circu-
lated in the State of Department, to be presented at the Potsdam Conference. One
such plan pleaded for the re-establishment of the international character of the Dan-
ube. A new permanent ‘authority’ should safeguard this and help to improve naviga-
tion on the river. Similar internationalisation schemes were discussed for other
European rivers, like the Rhine and the Elbe.36
Others made similar pleas for the Danube. Julian Huxley, the first Director of the
United Nations Education and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), made a direct
connection between the TVA and the future of the Danube. Inspired by a first-hand
visit to the Tennessee Valley, Huxley saw potential for applying the TVA’s methods
elsewhere in the world, like in the Middle East and India, but also for the Danube in
Europe, and promoted the idea of a ‘DVA’, or Danube Valley Authority.37
The same connection between territory and authority was envisioned by geogra-
pher George Kiss of the University of Michigan. Kiss was also a keen student and
admirer of the TVA, and argued that the river needed some kind of ‘unified control’,
particularly an authority to develop the Danube’s resources.38 According to Kiss,
the river needed an improved navigational channel, a better regulation of tributary
streams by multi-purpose dams, more effective flood controls, and the means to gen-
erate electricity. Kiss also suggested a number of canals, including the Oder–Danube
canal that would enable cheap bulk transport of Silesian coal. One of his more ambi-
tious canal suggestions was that the Rhine–Main–Danube canal should become ‘one
of the trunk waterways of Europe’.39
International organisations, too, picked up aspects of the TVA. The wartime
plans of the League of Nations similarly featured a DVA for ‘the electrification and
industrial development of South East Europe’.40 The United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE), initially brought into being in 1947 to buttress
the post-war European economic recovery, drew similar conclusions.41 A 1948 report
argued that Central and Eastern European countries located many post-war recon-
struction plans in the direct vicinity of the Danube. This allowed for land improve-
ment and reclamation, afforestation, the utilisation of electric-power resources, and
the amelioration of the Danube as a waterway. UNECE’s report explored several
factors hampering ‘optimum exploitation of the resources in the Danube Basin’.
UNECE’s officials thought that a closer co-ordination was needed: ‘Agricultural,
energy, flood-control, and navigation aspects would all need to be considered
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jointly’, concluded the ECE. Afforestation should help prevent soil erosion, which in
turn led to increased flooding.42 This clearly resembled a multi-purpose approach, an
integral aspect of the TVA.
UNECE experts thought the Danube was particularly well suited for the genera-
tion of electricity. The river’s floods were seasonally predictable, and the morphology
of the Danube’s tributary rivers enabled the construction of sufficiently large reser-
voirs. This allowed the number of dams on the main river to be limited, leaving it
open for navigation. The UNECE hoped to explore further co-ordination and inter-
connection with energy resources in the region, including coal resources in Poland
and Czechoslovakia. The Group also identified two specific projects, which both
offered great potential for electricity generation. One was the so-called Iron Gates, a
narrow gorge between Yugoslavia (today Serbia) and Romania. A second project
was the development of the Danube Canal between Passau and Devin, near
Bratislava. The first project could generate an estimated 400 to 1,000 megawatt (MW),
and the second was rated at 1,900 MW.43
The UNECE set up a Danube Study Group in the Electric Power Committee as a
starting point. A first meeting was scheduled for September 1948, in order to make
an inventory of the resources in the Danube basin and assess what projects were
already under construction. Yet a few days before the meeting, the Bulgarian and
Romanian government informed UNECE that it would not take part. A few days
later the ECE decided to cancel the meeting altogether.44
This event was typical for the political climate in 1948. In July of that year, a
meeting on Danubian navigational issues took place in Belgrade.45 The Danube
meeting in Belgrade exposed a clear difference of opinion between the two super-
powers, leading to a renewed division in terms of international governing bodies
on the Danube. The United States preferred to continue along pre-war lines, and
proposed an internationalised Danube from Ulm all the way down to the Black
Sea. In addition, they demanded that the Western powers become full members of
the new Danube Commission, because of their occupation zones in Germany and
Austria. The Soviet Union strongly disagreed, and interpreted the US wish to be
part of the European Danube Commission as an attempt to gain political and eco-
nomic influence on the Balkans. The Soviet Union felt that the Danube Commis-
sion should only exist of riparian states, with them as the sole non-riparian
member.46
With the conflict unresolved, the pre-war practice of two separate organisations
was renewed. The Western-oriented EDC chose Rome as its seat (not quite a ripar-
ian city!), and ceased to have concrete influence on the management of the river as
such. The IDC, with its headquarters in Belgrade, would have sway over naviga-
tional issues. Soviet influence was particularly strong: according to the statues, the
Secretary, the most dominant person in the Commission, was always a Soviet
citizen.47
The Soviet Union now de facto controlled the whole Danube basin from the
Austria-Hungary border to the Black Sea.48 Yet the Soviet Union did not turn
the new Commission into a vehicle for Soviet-led integration; it left responsibility for
the improvement of Danube navigation to individual countries and bilateral arrange-
ments.49 A similar division of labour would characterise the utilisation of Danubian
resources for electricity and irrigation. The planning and execution of such develop-
ment schemes took place within the framework of the CMEA’s framework, which is
discussed in the next section.
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III. Soviet-style development and CMEA
Before 1948, plans for the Danube often took the TVA as an explicit example. After
1948, the reality was a Socialist one. The path towards the industrialisation of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe was hence led and exemplified by the Soviet Union. In this
process, CMEA should buttress the modernisation of Central and Eastern European
countries, and further integrate the economies of the Socialist countries. This section
discusses the state of the art on the CMEA, before their activities vis-a-vis the Dan-
ube are scrutinised.
How should one define the relationship between the Soviet Union and CMEA?
James K. Libbey characterises the CMEA as a direct product of the cold war, in line
with Soviet interests.50 Many aspects of Soviet rule in Central and Eastern Europe
suggested a colonial relationship, in particular in the field of military and political
relations. Therefore, the organisation is often interpreted as a Soviet imperialist tool
to seize economic and political control over the region.51 But one could see CMEA
in another light as well. For example, the region lacked access to Western technologi-
cal assistance and support because of cold-war economic boycotts.52 The CMEA in
that sense represented a forum to obtain state-of-the-art Soviet technical knowledge
and material. According to Zubok, Stalin also hoped to set up a structure of produc-
tion that would render Western imports obsolete.53 In that sense, CMEA was hoped
to provide an alternative to Western know-how and technology.
The imperial tendencies of Moscow need some nuance as well. Several scholars
have claimed that by 1948 the Soviet Union’s imperial phase in Central and Eastern
Europe came to an end. By then, all countries were under local Communist parties’
rule. This is not to say that the Soviet Union no longer held any sway. If the US
‘empire’ in Western Europe was one by invitation, then Hungary was an empire by
coercion, argued Borhi. Soviet influence remained large, for example, via the ruling
Communist parties.54 Still, though CMEA was established in 1949, it only truly
came of age in the 1960s - thus after the ‘imperial’ age.55
What did this imply for CMEA and its functioning? In recent years, the nature
and aim of CMEA received more scholarly attention, and historians have provided
alternative interpretations for the internal dynamics of CMEA. In an instructive arti-
cle, Simon Godard argues that further scrutiny of the CMEA helps to deconstruct
the image of a monolithic Eastern bloc.56 Others like Sonja D. Schmid and Jirı Janac
argue that Moscow could not overpower its Western neighbours in technopolitical
relations, especially not after 1948.57 Surely the Soviet Union kept some indirect
economic control, for example via CMEA’s joint-stock companies (JSCs). Member-
states bundled their interests in JSCs for key sectors like mining, shipping, and ura-
nium ore, which bore a strong Soviet imprint. Yet this would be short-lived, as most
were abolished again by the mid-1950s.58 Especially under Khrushchev, the focus
reoriented on co-operation within CMEA and not blatant exploitation.59
That co-operation seemed to a large extent voluntary, and worked both ways.
Soviet science and technology was very appealing and often embraced by
Communists as well as non-Communists in Central and Eastern European nations,
particularly with channels to the West obstructed. Their relative economic underde-
velopment – with the exception of Czechoslovakia - also provided real incentives to
rely on ‘imported’ skills and technologies. Central and Eastern European elites (both
political as well as technical) found their ideas to be compatible with Soviet aims of
modernisation and progress, and regarded these as apolitical and ‘neutral’.60
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A reverse flow of technical expertise - from CMEA countries to the Soviet Union -
also sometimes took place, for example with Czechoslovakia and the German Demo-
cratic Republic.61
In addition, Socialist countries were at least able to set some limits on participa-
tion. The self-determined policy of Yugoslavia’s Tito was eventually tolerated by the
Soviet Union, as it gained CMEA observer status in 1956 and actively participated
in several fields. Romania was able to ‘maximise’ its sovereignty within CMEA and
successfully resisted several measures suggested by CMEA’s Executive Committee.62
In sum, co-operation with Moscow did not necessarily evolve around a dominant
imperial power and helpless colonies, but was within certain limits negotiated and
Soviet help often gratefully accepted - if only for the lack of an alternative. In other
words, insisting on a colonial relationship fails to take stock of the interests and
leverage of the Central and Eastern European countries themselves, and fails to rec-
ognise CMEA as a weak tool for domination.63 It should nevertheless be clear that
Moscow continued to play an influential and central role, but defining that role and
assessing its degrees of control requires additional research. The case of the Danube
will be a step in that direction.
IV. Developing the Danube
How did CMEA co-ordinate and facilitate the development of the Danube? Despite
a very slow start to the organisation itself, the inaugural meeting of CMEA in 1949
led to one decision regarding the river. The Romanian government - strongly sup-
ported and influenced by Stalin - proposed to build a canal linking the Danube with
the Black Sea. The canal shortened the distance from Cernavoda to the Black Sea
from 450 km to a mere 60 km.64 Van Meurs suggests that Stalin himself ordered the
construction of this canal, not the least because of the geo-strategic importance of
the Danube-mouth region in the first decade after the Second World War. This canal
would only be completed in 1984, however.65 Few other initiatives - for the river or
anything else - came from CMEA in its initial years. One particular obstacle to fur-
ther action was the Tito–Stalin split, which ruptured the relationship between Yugo-
slavia and the Soviet Union between 1948 and 1953.66 This placed all Danubian
plans that involved Yugoslavia, as well as any river-wide plans, on hold, until the
Yugoslav–Soviet reconciliation in 1955.
Starting in 1956, the CMEA Commission for the Exchange of Electric Energy
and Utilization of the Hydraulic Resources of the Danube River provided a new
institutional context. This Commission assisted CMEA countries in preparing plans
for utilisation of the Danube in a variety of ways, as well as expanding the number of
electricity transmission lines between their countries. The latter aspect - the eventual
construction of a regional electricity network - was explicitly tied to the former: the
exploitation of the Danube. As previously envisioned by the UNECE, the CMEA
thought about extending the generation capacity of the Danube with other rivers
and coalfields in the region.67 According to an estimate made at the first meeting of
the Commission, some 25–30 billion kWh of electricity could be generated per
annum on the Danube from Bratislava to the Black Sea.68
The type of river development was not unlike the TVA - at least on paper. In
these years, the notion of ‘complex’ river development became a common term to
denote Soviet-style water development that involved multiple purposes. This term is
very similar to the Western version of ‘multi-purpose’, and Central and Eastern
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European engineers sometimes named Western projects like the TVA and the devel-
opment of the St Lawrence River as examples.69 According to a report from the
Romanian delegation, the utilisation of Danubian hydropower should be co-ordi-
nated with irrigation, land reclamation, inland navigation, water supply, and fishing
functions. Newly planned dams would create reservoirs with a surface of approxi-
mately 6,400 km2, which in turn allowed an expansion of irrigation and water-supply
systems.70 Another important aspect of its work, as noted in one CMEA document,
was canalisation of the river: ‘The Danube is not just a future energy supplier; in due
time the river will be a waterway up to European standards.’71 Socialist plans for the
Danube can thus be characterised as multi-purpose.
The Commission established a fundamental principle during its 1956 delibera-
tions. Projects located in a single country would be developed unilaterally by these
respective countries, and projects involving more than one country would be pursued
multilaterally. CMEA (and hence Soviet) experts in the technical commission would
assist in co-ordination and planning, but not in the execution.72 This implied that the
role of CMEA was rather limited. The May 1956 meeting also established a five-step
scheme. First of all, each CMEA country would collect the necessary data (topo-
graphical, hydrological, geological) about their stretch of Danube. Subsequently,
Gidroproekt in Moscow would study these data. Thirdly, the CMEA Commission
would prepare a further programme for additional planning, examining, and research
work. This phase was scheduled for January 1957. By then, each country made their
additional research, and had more specified plans for their stretch of Danube. As a
last step, Gidroproekt – supported by experts from other CMEA countries - would
make final recommendations by July 1958. The CMEA Commission would discuss
and approve these recommendations at the September 1958 meeting.73
Gidroproekt – the Soviet hydro-engineering institute – assumed a leading role in
the process at the explicit wish of CMEA countries. The institute guided the overall
progress and made final recommendations. The actual river-based projects were left
to the responsible riparian states in uni- or multilateral frameworks. Prior to 1956,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary had already made a scheme for the extensive exploita-
tion of the Danube between Bratislava (Czechoslovakia) and Visegrad (Hungary).
The Iron Gates had also been studied, and a hydropower station had been envisioned
here at least since 1925.74 An agreement on flow regulation at the Iron Gates was
signed in 1956, from which Yugoslavia and Hungary stood to profit from land
improvement and Romania from additional irrigation water. In addition, all three
countries would have a new source of hydroelectric power within reach of their
respective grids. A precise scheme was still unclear in 1957, as planners from both
countries and Gidroproekt still discussed several options.75 Due to, again, deteriorat-
ing relations between Belgrade and Moscow, affairs concerning the Iron Gates were
arranged bilaterally and outside the CMEA framework.76
Gidroproekt received the data and started its studies in the fall of 1957, leading to
a number of preliminary conclusions. First, Gidroproekt considered it possible to
build a series of dams in the Danube. These dams would create reservoirs that regu-
lated water levels in the river. In total eleven hydraulic installations were mentioned
in the scheme, with an installed capacity of 5.4 million kW. In addition, navigation
circumstances should be improved, argued Gidroproekt, especially on the middle
stretch of the river. After building the cascade of dams, the Moscow institute advised
an upgrade of the inland shipping fleet in order to be more fuel and time efficient.
Lastly, Gidroproekt identified the best spots for land reclamation and irrigation in
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the Danube Valley, envisioning an expansion of irrigated land by 5 million ha.77 This
multi-purpose plan included a possible link between the Danube and the Oder and
Vistula basins. Further hydroelectric plants on tributary rivers would further expand
the electricity-production capacity with an additional 10 million kW.78
The CMEA Commission approved Gidroproekt’s report in September 1957, and
asked the member states to execute their respective plans. Dams at Nagymaros (Hun-
gary), the Iron Gates, and Wolfsthal were regarded to be priority projects - the latter
being negotiated between the Austrian and Czechoslovakian governments.79 As
Austria’s neutrality was a precondition for regaining its independence in 1955, it was
able to establish a co-operative relationship with Western Europe but also explore
contacts with countries behind the Iron Curtain. In the field of electricity, it had been
involved in a project to import power from Poland and Czechoslovakia since 1945.80
A significant change occurred in 1958, as the CMEA Commission on the Danube
transformed into the Permanent Commission for Electric Energy.81 After only a few
years of multilateral planning under the guidance of Gidroproekt, the implementa-
tion was left to the countries themselves. No international co-ordination or authority
was deemed necessary. This was also illustrated by an initiative of the UNECE.
In 1958, UNECE Secretary-General Tuomioja tried to become involved in the
Danube’s development, and undertook steps to rejuvenate the Danube Study Group.
This Group, to be composed of experts from riparian states and other interested
countries, should discuss ‘the multi-purpose development of the Danube, like irriga-
tion, navigation, flood control, and electricity generation’.82 But responses were luke-
warm at best. The Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Romania never cared to respond to
the invitation. Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Austria supplied the UNECE with infor-
mation about their parts of the river, but expressed feelings of ambiguity for a more
comprehensive consultation. The bilateral route, as was the case between the Austri-
ans and the Czechoslovaks, seemed to be the preferred method of operation.83 This
rejection took place against the backdrop of an improving relationship between
CMEA and UNECE. Since 1959, firmer links were established between their respec-
tive Secretariats as both hoped to improve East–West relations.84 Rejecting co-oper-
ation with the UNECE on the Danube thus reflected the particular approach taken
by Central and Eastern European states.
VI. The Danube developed?
What eventually came of these plans for the Danube? According to a 1959 UNECE
report, eight plants were operational, all of which were located on the river between
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Austria, and most of them already
existed before the Second World War.85 By then, the dams envisioned and discussed
within the CMEA framework existed on the planning tables only. One of the priority
projects was the Wolfsthal plant, located in a section where the river acts as frontier
between Austria and Czechoslovakia. A provisional estimate projected a plant
capacity of 200 MW. Two other schemes were jointly planned by Czechoslovakia
and Hungary, respectively Nagymaros (40–50 km upstream from Budapest) and the
Gabčikovo Dam between Bratislava and Nagymaros. These two dams were consid-
ered together, because of their complementary nature in terms of flood control and
electricity generation. These were scheduled to be completed in 1970 and were clearly
multipurpose projects; the first would generate an estimated 200 MW and irrigate
150,000 ha of land, and the latter 700 MW and 100,000 ha.86 This section of the
The International History Review 89
Danube had always been hard to navigate and needed upgrading. Plans for one other
priority project, the Iron Gates between Romania and Yugoslavia, also remained on
the agenda.87
Overall, thus, progress was slow, and large projects like the Iron Gates, Wolfs-
thal, and Nagymaros took a long time to materialise, if at all. Over time, they met
ever greater opposition. In addition to growing opposition to these huge projects
interfering with nature, alternative forms of energy were developed as well. Nuclear
energy particularly presented an alternative, which is regarded to be one of the most
successful fields of co-operation within CMEA – and also took place largely in a
bilateral fashion.88 This is to argue that the relative importance of hydroelectric facil-
ities decreased, and therefore the focus on the Danube as a supplier of electricity
became less pronounced.
Yugoslavia and Romania reached a consensus in 1960 on the Iron Gates project,
and a bilateral treaty was signed three years later. The 1956 plans became less ambi-
tious, as the power-plant capacity was reduced to 10.7 million MWh per year
(instead of the initial 35 million MWh). Deliberations took place within the context
of the Danube Commission, and not within the CMEA framework, because of the
tense relations between Belgrade and Moscow.89 Only in 1964 did the building of the
dam commence, to be completed in 1972.90 The construction of Iron Gate I, as it
became known, was followed by Iron Gate II (opened in 1984). Today, this complex
has a combined capacity of 1,026 MW for Serbia and 1,487 MW for Romania.91 The
constructions at the Iron Gates also improved shipping possibilities. This part of the
river had always been the most difficult to navigate, but the hydroelectric plants,
equipped with the biggest locks on the Danube, helped to improve this.
Other projected schemes fared less well. The Austrian and Czechoslovak authori-
ties abandoned the dam project at Wolfsthal in the late 1950s under fierce financial
pressures and protests against its environmental impact. Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary signed a treaty on the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros project in 1977, and the twin
dams were envisioned to improve the river’s navigability and generate electricity.
The Hungarian dams were planned to be in full service by 1986, and its Czechoslovak
counterpart three years later.92 The dams quickly attained symbolic status in their
respective countries, but in a Janus-face fashion; whereas the Czechoslovak Gabči-
kovo Dam became popularly seen as a positive symbol, the Nagymaros in Hungary
gained a negative connotation.93 In the latter country, protests from scientists and
engineers against the environmental impact of the dam were picked up by the wider
population. This led the Hungarian government to suspend construction in 1981.
Hungary terminated the 1977 agreement in 1992, and today only Gabčikovo stands
completed.94
A 2011 map of the Danube shows Gabčikovo as the only dam on the stretch
between the Austrian-Czech border and the Iron Gates near Belgrade.95 The
CMEA’s initial scheme for the Danube is largely unfulfilled.
There is little chance that it will ever be. Since 1989, significant changes took place
with regard to the involvement of international organisations. First, of course, there
was the demise of CMEA in 1991. At the same time, new international organisations
have become involved, and new priorities came along, particularly environmental
protection. The International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River
was set up in 1998, to protect and promote sustainable and equitable water manage-
ment in the Danube basin. With regard to navigation, the Danube Commission
opened up to the West, and also welcomed international organisations like the
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UNECE and the European Union (EU) as observers. The latter has set up the EU
Strategy for the Danube Region, a platform between stakeholders, riparian coun-
tries, and the European Commission, to co-ordinate policy and boost development.96
Given the current emphasis on navigation and the environment, a return to the vast
and extensive dam schemes of the 1960s seems highly unlikely, and practically impos-
sible given today’s popular opinion about such projects.97
VI. Conclusions: the Danube’s divided development
This article opened by citing a US Senate report fearing Soviet competition in the
field of river development. With the TVA, the United States had an appealing, pow-
erful, and inspirational model for developing rivers. The Senate Commission never-
theless felt that Soviet-style river development was making huge progress, and came
to challenge the perceived US hegemony in this field. While studying the develop-
ment of the Danube, this article addressed two questions: first, how the Soviet
‘alternative modernity’ affected the river’s development; and second, how and if the
Soviet model really was different from the TVA model. An important sub-question
of the latter is to what extent the Soviets were able to impose their will on the river’s
development, particularly within the CMEA framework.
The development of the Danube was a multi-purpose effort, as the river’s utilisa-
tion focused on a number of interlocked purposes. One of these was improving navi-
gation. This was also the oldest riverine activity for the Danube, dating back to the
nineteenth century. A second major theme was developing hydropower. Several
plans and suggestions appeared during the Second World War and shortly after,
most of which were based on, or at least inspired by, the TVA. Yet the cold war
affected the development of the Danube. Since 1948, the contours of an East–West
split over the river became apparent and institutionalised, and therewith the TVA
disappeared as an inspiration. Instead, Soviet models of river development entered
the scene. The Gidroproekt became the main institution for planning, designing, and
constructing large water-related projects in the Soviet Union in 1930. In many ways,
Gidroproekt’s style of river development was technically similar to that of the TVA,
although within the Soviet Union (and on the Black Sea Canal) the use of unfree
labour was more rule than exception - hence its direct relation with the NKVD.
The exported version of Soviet river development lacked the murderous element,
as well as the breakneck pace and strong centralisation so apparent in Soviet domes-
tic projects. This becomes even more visible when studying the case of the Danube,
whose post-war development was a divided one. To be sure, such a division was not
entirely new in the river’s history. Between 1856 and 1920, only the lower part of
the Danube fell under international control. Starting in 1920, not one, but two
Danube Commissions existed. Politics seemingly always overshadowed economic
interests on the river. The Great Powers of their time - Great Britain during the
inter-war period, Nazi Germany before and during the Second World War, and the
United States and Soviet Union after 1945 - all tried to be involved in Danubian
affairs.98
Yet the post-1945 development of the Danube was divided in two novel ways.
First, there was the geographical split. Shortly after the war, it became apparent that
East–West co-operation on the Danube was illusionary. The Iron Curtain ran across
the river, with the Federal Republic of firmly in the West, and Austria assuming a
middle position. The countries to the East fell within the Soviet sphere of influence.
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Still, the Socialist bloc was not as uniform as one might expect. The construction of a
large dam on the Danube at the Romanian–Yugoslav border - the Iron Gates - was
postponed due to poor relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The
CMEA, too, did not appear as a tool in the hands of the Soviet Union solely to pur-
sue her own interests. The member countries were strongly influenced by Soviet engi-
neering, but certainly not coerced very strongly.
This strongly related to a second type of division. The development of the Ten-
nessee and its tributaries was in the hands of a single authority, which provided an
integrated multi-purpose scheme for the river’s utilization. Planners prior to 1948
similarly argued for a single co-ordinating and supervisory body. Yet in contrast to
the unified TVA approach, the CMEA’s plans for the Danube did not feature such
an authority, contrary to what one might expect. The CMEA Standing Commis-
sion acted as a platform to discuss plans for the river, with all riparian states
involved. Yet in subsequent stages the river was divided into uni- and bilateral
projects. There was no central authority for the Danube’s development, nor was
the Soviet Union supervising the process. In fact, the CMEA Committee changed
its name and function to reflect its new primary function: boasting a process of
electrification and interconnection of electric power grids in the region. The
CMEA no longer discussed the utilisation of the Danube from 1958 onwards.
With the overarching plan in existence, it was left to the countries themselves to
pursue the plan’s execution, either uni- or bilaterally. This was exemplified by the
lack of enthusiasm of the Socialist countries to join the UNECE’s attempt to reju-
venate the Study Group for the Danube. In addition, although most of the plans
were multi-purpose at least in writing, navigation was left to the already existing
Danube Commission. In other words, one of the river’s functions was ‘outsourced’
to a third body. The institutional legacy of the international river commissions for
the Danube had set strong precedents for that.
What was the role of Gidroproekt after 1948? Contrary to what one might
suspect, this was not a very dominant overall role, and relatively short-lived.
Their involvement in the planning phase was undisputed, and their interference
was to the joy of CMEA countries - at least, as the records indicate, and in line
with findings by Janac and Schmidt who argue that Soviet technological knowl-
edge certainly appealed to technical experts in CMEA countries. Hence, the over-
all role of the Soviet Union appears to have been limited to that of Gidroproekt,
which was quite prominent, but only during the planning process. During his
reign, Stalin did execute large-scale brute-force transformations of riverscapes, as
the example of the Black Sea Channel shows. But in the 1960s, implementation
was left to the CMEA countries themselves, and lacked the steering hand from
Moscow.
Despite these differences, the planning style of Gidroproekt had some similarities
with the TVA style of river development. The emphasis on multi-purpose dams and
integrated planning, for example, combining electricity generation with irrigation
and flood control, strikes as very similar. The Senate Committee’s report equally rec-
ognised this, and characterised Soviet-style development as ‘multi-purpose’ and the
overall use of scientific and technological means as ‘not identical but basically similar
to the United States’.99 Yet as shown in this article, the export of the Soviet style of
river development to the Danube gave little cause for concern to the US Senate, as
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